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COMMENT
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY "EXCEPTION"
Henry Paul Monaghan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Seminole Tribe v. Florida' is the 1995 Term's illustration of the
importance that a narrow, but solid, five-Justice majority2 of the
Supreme Court attaches to the constitutional underpinnings of "Our
Federalism."3 In Seminole Tribe, this majority declared that Congress
lacks authority under its Article I, Section 8 regulatory powers to sub-
ject unconsenting states to suits initiated in federal court by private
persons.4 The very same majority had previously made clear its inten-
tion to implement the original constitutional understanding of a na-
tional government of limited powers,5 especially when the national
government attempted to "commandeer" state legislative and adminis-
trative processes.6 This aversion to federal commandeering of state or-
gans of government 7 moved the Seminole Tribe Court to build on its
decision in United States v. Lopezs and further curb Congress's Coin-
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University.
116 S. CL 1114 (1996).
2 The majority consisted of the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. It has broken ranks only once. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, xiS S. Ct. 1842
(x995), Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote for a holding that states could not impose term
limits or any qualifications for congressional office other than those set forth in the Constitution.
See id. at 1852-66, 1872-75; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, z994 Term -
Comment: Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, iog HARV. L. REv. 78,
78-81 (1995) (arguing that both the majority and the dissent in Thornton resorted to structural
default rules regarding the balance of power between the states and the federal government be-
cause such rules act as a needed tiebreaker between an ambiguous text and history).
3 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (explaining that the concept of "Our Federal-
ism" represents a system in which the national government seeks to vindicate and protect federal
rights and interests in ways that do "not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States").
4 See Seminole Tribe, i6 S. CL at 1122, 1128 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
5 See United States v. Lopez, x5 S. CL 1624, 1626, 2634 (1995).
6 See New York v. United States, so5 U.S. 144, x61 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (ig8i)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 Again, the same majority assembled in Seminole Tribe as in New York (although this time
minus Justice Souter) and those Justices were understandably concerned with Congress's direction
to a state governor "to bargain in good faith." See infra p. 109.
8 See Lopez, x5 S. CL at 163o-33 (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
prohibited possession of a gun in a school zone, exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority
because the proscribed activity did not substantially affect interstate commerce).
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merce Clause power 9 - this time by withdrawing federal court reme-
dial avenues for enforcement of a federal right against an
unconsenting state. 10
This Comment argues that, although Seminole Tribe inflates the
rhetoric of "inherent state sovereignty," the majority in fact left firmly
in place the fundamental reality of state accountability in federal court
for violation of federal law. After a brief overview of Eleventh
Amendment doctrine and a review of the statute involved and the
opinions in the case, this Comment presents other, more plausible ra-
tionales that the Court could have followed in Seminole Tribe and that
could have led to either affirming or reversing the court of appeals.
Next, the Comment outlines why I believe that the Court chose to
forgo these admittedly easier possible avenues and instead based its
decision on "background postulates" of state sovereign immunity from
federal court suit. Essentially, I argue that Seminole Tribe reflects the
Court's desire to confront the federal-state relation question directly
and to make a statement about state autonomy. Finally, I argue that,
despite this symbolic statement to the contrary, little has changed after
the Seminole Tribe decision because the rule of Ex parte Young" re-
mains in full force. In suits for prospective relief, states are still ac-
countable in federal court - through their officers - for the violation
of federal law. In that sense, sovereign immunity has become a rare
exception to the otherwise prevailing system of state governmental ac-
countability in federal court for violations of federal law, an exception
that many, including this author, find difficult to justify.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The origin and development of the doctrine of state sovereign im-
munity have been presented many times.' 2 It seems more helpful here
to survey briefly the peaks and valleys of the legal landscape when
Seminole Tribe reached the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court.
9 Although Seminole Tribe arose under the Indian Commerce Clause, rather than the Inter-
state Commerce Clause, its effects clearly apply to both because it overruled Union Gas.
10 See Seminole Tribe, xI6 S. CL at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's
decision not only precluded a federal remedy for the statute at issue, but also prevented Congress
from providing a federal forum in a broad range of actions against the states). But see Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. CL at 1131 nn.14 & i6 (pointing to three alternative methods of ensuring the states'
compliance with federal law).
11 209 U.S. 123 (I908).
12 There seem to be nearly as many accounts as there are legal historians. For an excellent
survey of the entire subject, including the relevant literature, see RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 994-1105 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER], and RICHARD H. FAL-
LON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM I6-5o (Supp. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER SUPPLEMENT].
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A. The Text of the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."13 On its face, the amendment says nothing about sovereign im-
munity at all. In essence, it reads as a restriction on Article MI's grant
of jurisdiction to the federal courts.14 Some have read this restriction
to foreclose all Article 111 jurisdiction if a citizen of another state sues
a state, even if the suit is prosecuted under federal rather than state
law. Others take a "diversity" view: the amendment simply repeals
pro tanto one of the original grants of diversity jurisdiction.' 5  For
them, the amendment is simply a limitation on party-based (state/
noncitizen, state/alien) federal jurisdiction under Article 111.16 Under
neither interpretation does the text support the notion that a state can-
not be sued by its own citizens in federal court.
B. Hans v. Louisiana
Hans v. Louisiana17 held that a private person could not assert
federal rights against a state eo nomine in the federal court without its
consent - even if the plaintiff wished to sue his own state.18 Depend-
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
Is See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Supreme Court, x983 Term - Comment: Wrong DTrns: The
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Hagv. L. REv. 6x, 67 (1984); see also Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. CL at IIo n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting) (endorsing the "diversity" view); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286 (i985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Those who have ar-
gued that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to constitutionalize a broad principle of state
sovereign immunity have always elided the question of why Congress would have chosen the
language of the Amendment as enacted to state such a broad principle.). See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 1052-55 (discussing the "diversity" interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment as reflected in Atascadero and Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987)).
16 The origins of this approach extend back to Cohens v. Virginia, ig U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821). After holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar appellate jurisdiction over the
case before it, the Court stated that should the Court "be mistaken [in this], the error does not
affect the case" because the action, involving Virginians suing their own state, was outside the
scope of the Amendment. Id. at 412. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. x (189o), rejected this analysis
as dicta. See id. at 20.
17 134 U.S. 1 (2890).
18 See id. at i5. The Hans doctrine, however, does not bar the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over suits initiated in state courts, a rule that has its origin in Cohens, see ig U.S. at
405-Ir. In fact, even prior to Cohens, the Court had exercised appellate jurisdiction in controver-
sies between private persons and states, most notably in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (i8ig). For an excellent discussion of the interaction between the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment, see Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 13-29 (1988). The
Court reaffirmed Cohens in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496
U.S. x8 (iggo): "The Eleventh Amendment does n'ot constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over cases arising from the state courts." Id. at 31.
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ing upon one's understanding of history, Hans either created or re-
vived the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
In Hans, a state citizen sued under the district court's then re-
cently conferred federal question jurisdiction based upon the state's
failure to pay bond interest. The claim was that a state constitutional
amendment barring interest payments on its bonds violated the Con-
tracts Clause. 19 The Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment
precluded suits by in-state plaintiffs, quoting Hamilton's well known
remarks in The Federalist No. 81:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the
general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes
of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the
plan of the convention, it will remain with the States .... 20
The Hans Court acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment was
not literally applicable.2 1 But the Court treated the amendment as ex-
pressing a general understanding that the majority in Chisholm v. Geor-
gia22 (another bondholder suit, albeit one based on the state law of
assumpsit) had wrongly failed to recognize state sovereign immunity:
23
"This amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the
whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually re-
versed the decision of the Supreme Court [in Chisholm].
''24
In fact, the real force of the Hans Court's analysis rested upon a
controversial reading of the Eleventh Amendment: in the Court's terms,
the amendment barred federal court suits by noncitizens even when su-
ing on federal rights.25  On that premise, the Court concluded that it
19 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § io, cl. i. The Hans Court seemed to assume that (in modern
terms) the clause created an implied right of action.
20 Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). Hamilton
was speaking specifically of a narrow but important concern: debt collection suits. He argued
that by adoption of the Constitution, states would not be "divested of the privilege of paying their
own debts in their own way." THE FEDERALIST No. 8i, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., i96f). Although it has acknowledged the crucial role of fiscal concerns in the pas-
sage of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has noted that the amendment also "em-
phasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system." Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., Ii5 S. Ct. 394, 400 (1994).
21 See Hans, 134 U.S. at xo.
22 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (i793).
23 Like Hans, Chisholm was a suit against a state by a private person based upon a state
default on its bond obligations. Unlike Hans, however, the suit was based entirely on state com-
mon law; no Contracts Clause claim was discussed. See id. at 420, 428; Hart & Wechsler, supra
note 12, at 1047.
24 Hans, 134 U.S. at ii.
2S See id. at zo-ii. The Hans Court noted that it had been "clearly established" in other
cases that suits by noncitizens against a state were barred, even if they involved a federal ques-
tion, id. at io, but the Court in those cases may have been assuming that no constitutional Con-
tracts Clause claim was being made. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 1o55 n.22.
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would be anomalous ever to allow a state to be sued by its own citizens
in federal court:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it
was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own
state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other
states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Con-
gress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a
proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being
sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws
of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by
the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its
face.26
For the commentators urging a diversity view, however, any in-
dependent doctrine of sovereign immunity exists only as a matter of fed-
eral "constitutional" common law, which the courts may enforce only
absent contrary direction by Congress. 27 Under this conception, Hans is
downgraded to a default, "clear-statement rule" - a federal common
law rule operative only until Congress clearly abrogates it.2 8 Yet this
interpretation of Hans seems quite strained.29 The decision contains no
suggestion that Congress could have altered the result by being clear
about its intention to do so.
30
C. The Scope of Congressional Abrogation of State Immunity
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized at least one area in which
Congress can override state sovereign immunity in federal court. In
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,31 the Court established that Congress could abro-
gate state sovereign immunity when implementing the enforcement
26 Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
27 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, z974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. i, I0-30 (1975).
28 HART & WECHSLER SUPPLEMENT, sup a note 12, at 43; cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. i, i9 (1989) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (warning against an exaggerated reading of Hans),
overruled by Seminole Tribe, xI6 S. Ct. 1I4 (x996). Justices Stevens and Souter appealed to this
theory in their Seminole Tribe dissents. They argued that Hans dealt only with a constitutionally
implied cause of action based on the Contracts Clause, and therefore never addressed the question
of Congress's power to abrogate immunity; as a result, there was no constitutional barrier to
congressional abrogation. See Seminole Tribe, i6 S. Ct. at 1137-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 1153 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29 "Hans was not expressing some narrow objection to the particular federal power by which
Louisiana had been haled into court, but was rather enunciating a fundamental principle of feder-
alism, evidenced by the Eleventh Amendment, that the States retained their sovereign prerogative
of immunity." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 "The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden
by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States .... The suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law."
Hans, 134 U.S. at i5-6. Only after its constitutional discussion did the Hans Court also note
that Congress "did not intend to invest its courts with any new and strange jurisdiction." Id. at
3' 427 U.S. 445 (i976).
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provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 2 In an opinion
by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated: "When Congress acts pur-
suant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is ple-
nary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that
authority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state author-
ity. "33  Given the history of states' discrimination against minorities,
the Court correctly viewed a federal forum - and Congress's ability
to provide one - as part and parcel of congressional remedial author-
ity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 3 4 is the only other decision directly
recognizing congressional power to abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity in suits by private parties, this time under the
Interstate Commerce Clause.35 The Union Gas plurality opinion pro-
duced considerable confusion, however, because Justice Brennan ad-
vanced justifications that pointed in quite different directions. The
plurality noted that, "[l]ike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause with one hand gives power to Congress while, with the other,
it takes power away from the States."36 Justice Brennan insisted that
"the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without
the authority to render States liable in damages."3 7 The states had,
therefore, necessarily surrendered a degree of their sovereign immunity
in 1789 as part of the constitutional plan.3 8 Seemingly, this explana-
tion would apply to all exercises of congressional regulatory authority
under Article I, Section 8. However, Justice Brennan also said that
"[i]t would be difficult to overstate the breadth and depth of the com-
32 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § S.
33 Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. This reasoning was reiterated in Seminole Tribe. See Semi-
nole Tribe, xx6 S. CtL at 1125. Although this rationale would apply to legislation based upon all
amendments framed as limitations on state authority, it might be inapplicable to congressional
legislation enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. That amendment does not solely "embody limi-
tations on state authority"; it applies to the federal government and private persons as well. See
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § i.
34 491 U.S. 1 (989). Writing for the Union Gas plurality, Justice Brennan built upon his
dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), in which he had advanced
his view that the amendment was wholly inapplicable to litigants asserting a federal right:
[The Eleventh Amendment was adopted simply] to remedy an interpretation of the consti-
tution that would have had the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses of Article III
abrogating the state law of sovereign immunity on state law causes of action brought in
federal courts . . . .The original constitution did not embody a principle of sovereign
immunity as a limit on the federal power. There is simply no reason to believe that the
Eleventh Amendment established such a broad principle for the first time.
Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
35 See Union Gas, 49r U.S. at 19-20 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
36 Id. at I6.
37 Id. at x9.
38 See id. at i9-2o. For Justice Brennan, Article III did not constitutionalize state immunity,
the Eleventh Amendment did not reinstate it, and Article I powers were layered over common
law state sovereign immunity such that immunity could be abrogated.
1996]
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merce power,"39 suggesting that congressional power over interstate
commerce was unique. Justice White's enigmatic concurrence pro-
vided the necessary fifth vote.40 Although he agreed with the result,
he added, without explanation, that he did "not agree with much of
[Justice Brennan's] reasoning."41 Largely relying on Hans, four Jus-
tices dissented, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia.
42
I]I. IGRA
Seminole Tribe concerned the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
("IGRA'). 43 IGRA stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Cali-
fornia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,44 which held that various
federal enactments did not authorize enforcement of state legislation
regulating Indian tribes' operation of bingo and poker games on their
reservations. 45 The Court found the state legislation to be "civil/regu-
latory," as opposed to "criminallprohibitory,"46 and only the latter cate-
gory of legislation fell within the federal statute's jurisdictional
grant.4 7 Cabazon created a regulatory vacuum, because "existing Fed-
eral law d[id] not provide clear standards or regulations for the con-
duct of gaming on Indian lands."48 After considerable debate
concerning the appropriate state role in the regulation of gambling on
Indian reservations, Congress enacted IGRA. The primary legislative
purpose was "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming
by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic develop-
ment, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."49 The Act de-
fines classes of Indian gaming,50 establishes the National Indian
Gaming Commission to monitor and regulate some forms of Indian
39 Id. at 20.
40 See id. at 45 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 Id. at 57. "Doesn't a Justice who casts the deciding vote have some obligation to provide
an explanation that is intelligible to the legal community?" HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at
1102.
42 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tice Scalia was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
43 Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (i988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994)).
44 48o U.S. 202 (1987).
4S See id. at 221-22.
46 Id. at 209.
47 See id. at 207-Il.
48 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3) (I994).
49 Id. § 2702(I). The Act also aimed to shield Indian gambling from the influence of orga-
nized crime "and other corrupting influences," to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary bene-
ficiary of the gaming operation, and to ensure that gaming "is conducted fairly and honestly by
both the operators and players." Id. § 2702(2). Nonetheless, IGRA had an unanticipated by-prod-
uct: it spurred gambling. One letter to the editor of the New York Times stated that IGRA "has
backfired." Nicholas Goldin, Tribal Casinos Catalyzed Gambling's Spread, N.Y. TIMES, June io,
1996, at A16 (letter to the editor) ("It is unlikely that Congress anticipated such a profound social
and economic fallout from its decision to encourage tribal gambling.).
50 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(8).
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gaming,51 and provides a tribal-state "compacting" procedure through
which states may participate in the regulation of Indian gaming.
5 2
IGRA divides Indian gaming into three "classes,"53 the most impor-
tant of which is class M.5 4 Class III gaming includes house banking
games like baccarat, chemin de fer, and blackjack, casino games like
roulette, craps, slot machines, horse and dog racing, and lotteries.55 So
far as pertinent here, class III gaming activities are lawful on Indian
lands if those activities are authorized (i) by an ordinance or resolu-
tion that is adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe, (2)
located in a state that permits such gaming, and (3) "conducted in con-
formance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe
and the State."5
6
For class III gaming, IGRA prescribes a negotiating process. Upon
receiving a request to form a tribal-state compact, a state "shall negoti-
ate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact."
57
However, to ensure that no covered state could preclude or unreason-
ably delay lawful Indian gaming, IGRA provides tribes with a remedy
in the federal courts if no mutually satisfactory compact is achieved.
IGRA states specifically:
[T]he United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over -
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the
failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact [regulating class III gam-
ing] .. .or to conduct such negotiations in good faith .... ss
After a tribe has introduced evidence that no tribal-state compact has
been concluded and that the state did not respond to the tribe's request
to negotiate, or did not respond in good faith, "the burden of proof shall
be upon the State to prove that the State has negotiated with the Indian
tribe in good faith."59 The district court may take into account factors
51 See id. §§ 2704-2709.
52 See id. § 271o(d).
53 Class I gaming, which is governed and regulated solely by individual Indian tribes, see id.
§ 271o(a)(i), includes little more than "social games solely for prizes of minimal value." Id.
§ 2703(6). Class II gaming, which is subject to certain federal regulations, see id. § 2710(b), in-
cludes bingo and comparable games, see id. § 2703(7XA)(i), as well as non-banking card games
where allowed by state law, see id. §§ 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I), 270 3 (7)(B).
54 Class III includes "all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming." Id.
§ 2703(8).
55 See id.; 25 C.F.1R § 5024 (1996).
S6 25 U.S.C. § 271o(d)(i)(A)-(C). Certain additional minor requirements also apply. See Semi-
nole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1120.
s7 25 U.S.C. § 271o(d)(3)(A). The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to approve any tribal-
state compact resulting from a successful negotiation process. See id. § 271o(d)(8)(A). The Secre-
tary may disapprove such a compact only if the compact violates any provision of IGRA, another
federal law, or any trust obligations of the United States to Indians. See id. § 271o(dX8)(B)(i)-(ui).
The Secretary must publish notice of any approved tribal-state compact in the Federal Register.
See id. § 271o(d)(8)(D).
58 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(AXi).
59 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii).
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such as "the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity,
and adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activities.
60
The district court's role is unusual. If the court concludes that a
state failed to negotiate in good faith, the court "shall order the State
and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact within a 6o-day pe-
riod."61 If they fail to do so, each party must submit to a court-ap-
pointed mediator a proposed compact containing its "last best offer."
62
At this point, the district court's role apparently comes to an end.
The mediator selects the compact that "best comports with the terms
of [IGRA] and any other applicable Federal law and with the findings
and order of the court."63 Once the mediator has submitted the selected
compact to the state and the tribe, the state has sixty days within which
to consent to that compact. 64 If the state does consent, the compact is
treated as a tribal-state compact entered into by agreement.65 If the
state does not consent, "the mediator shall notify the Secretary [of the
Interior] and the Secretary shall prescribe, in consultation with the In-
dian tribe, procedures" 66 for the class III gaming "which are consistent
with the proposed compact selected by the mediator, ...the provisions
of [IGRA], and the relevant provisions of the laws of the State."
67
IV. THE DECISION
After negotiations had broken down between Florida officials and
the Seminole tribe - largely over the question of which types of gam-
60 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(1). A state's demand for taxing authority over the tribe or Indian
land, however, is evidence of a failure to negotiate in good faith. See id. § 271o(d)(7)(B)(iii)(II).
61 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). The National Labor Relations Act, of course, requires good faith in
employment bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § i6o(e) (i994); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., x6 S. CL
2116, 2120-21 (1996). The relevance of labor law precedents would have had to be considered in
this context. Interestingly, by the time the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seminole Tribe,
the district court had found that the Governor had bargained in good faith. See Seminole THbe,
i16 S. Ct. at 1122 n.6.
62 25 U.S.C. § 271o(d)(7)(B)(iv).
63 Id.
64 See id. § 271o(d)(7)(B)(v)-(vii).
65 See id. § 271o(d)(7)(B)(vi).
66 Id. § 2710Cd)(7)(B)(vil).
67 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(1B)(vii)(I). In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that the limited role of
the federal courts authorized by IGRA was jurisdictionally vulnerable because of the role subse-
quently played by the Executive Branch. See Seminole Tribe, ri6 S. Ct. at 1x44-45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 271o(d)(7)(B)) ("[If the District Court determines that the State's
inflexibility constitutes a failure to negotiate in good faith, ... the maximum sanction that the
Court can impose is an order that refers the controversy to a member of the Executive Branch of
the Government for resolution."). This concern is unfounded. The Executive Branch cannot re-
vise a court's order or determinations. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 104-06; see
also Note, Executive Revision of Judicial Decisions, iog HARv. L. REV. 2020, 2022-24 (2996)
(discussing the history of the rule against executive revision of judicial decisions). See generally
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at I04-I5 (collecting cases on finality of judicial decisions).
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bling were permitted under Florida state law68 - the tribe sued the
state and its Governor. The defendants secured interlocutory review
of the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss.
69
In the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the tribe ad-
vanced several arguments about why the suit against Florida could be
maintained, each of which was rejected in an opinion by Chief Judge
Tjoflat.70 The court first rejected the tribe's claims that Florida had
consented to suit by adopting its own constitution, by ratifying the
United States Constitution, and by participating in IGRA negotia-
tions.71 The court then turned to the decisive issue: congressional
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian Com-
merce Clause. After rejecting several "preliminary" arguments, 72 the
court of appeals addressed Union Gas.7 3 Openly dubious of the plu-
rality opinion in Union Gas,74 and recognizing that "a majority of the
present Court [might] disagree with Union Gas,"75 the court of appeals
confined the scope of Union Gas to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
7 6
68 See Brief of Respondents at 3-4, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12).
69 See Seminole Tribe, ii6 S. Ct at 1121.
70 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, ii F.3d ioi6, 1022-29 (iith Cir. 1994).
71 See id. at 1021-23.
72 The tribe first claimed that IGRA had been enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, because Congress had in effect set up a licensing system, such that the tribal license consti-
tuted both "liberty" and "property" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at
1025. But this argument "ignore[ld] the discretionary nature of the compacting process envisioned
by IGRA ...[which] does not create an entitlement to operate gambling operations" that the
Fourteenth Amendment would protect Id. The court of appeals next rejected the tribe's claim
that the statute was based not on the Indian Commerce Clause, but on the Interstate Commerce
Clause itself, thereby bringing Union Gas directly into play. See id. at 1025-26. The court of
appeals observed that although concerns about the role of organized crime were expressed in the
statute, its aim was not to remove a burden on interstate commerce, but to ensure that Indian
tribes benefited from the legislation. See id. at 1026.
73 See id. at 1026.
74 See id. at 1026-27 & n.12.
75 Id. at 1027.
76. See id. According to the court of appeals, this conclusion was "bolstered by the unique
qualities that distinguish the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause." Id.
The court of appeals relied upon the reasoning in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490
U.S. 163 (x989), in which the Supreme Court stated that the two clauses "have very different
applications." Seminole Tribe, ii F.3d at 1027 (quoting Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the Interstate Commerce Clause was to promote
free trade among the states, whereas the "central function" of the Indian Commerce Clause was
"to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs." Id. (quoting
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals also
read Union Gas narrowly, granting "federal jurisdiction over states only when the states partake
in an activity typical of private individuals." Id. This claim finds no support in the Supreme
Court's previous decisions, as both the tribe and the United States pointed out in their briefs. See
Brief for Petitioner at 21-23, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29-30, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12).
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With Union Gas out of the way, the court of appeals assumed that
state sovereign immunity followed as a matter of course.
77
A. Rejecting Union Gas
The Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by the Chief Justice.78
For the majority, Seminole Tribe was simply a replay of Union Gas,
which in turn was a judicial aberration that had to be overruled.79 In
order to reach the constitutional question, however, the Court had to
address the preliminary issue of Congress's "clear intent" to abrogate.
80
Although the Court adhered to its requirement that Congress make its
intention to abrogate state immunity "unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute,"8' the Court did not require Congress to refer
explicitly to the Eleventh Amendment in the statute. Instead, the
Court found that "the numerous references to the 'State' in the text of
§ 27io(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through
IGRA to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit."
8 2
The Court was then ready to address head on the constitutional
issue of Congress's power to abrogate state immunity. The Court first
stated that it had found that private parties could summon unconsent-
ing states to federal court under only two provisions of the Constitu-
tion 83 and that only the Union Gas Commerce Clause exception was
implicated here. Both the tribe and the United States had sought to
avoid substantial reliance upon Union Gas, apparently fearing that it
might fail to command support. They had argued instead that the
Indian Commerce Clause provides a firm basis for congressional au-
77 See Seminole Tribe, ii F.3d at 1028.
78 See Seminole Tribe, xi6 S. Ct. at 1133.
79 "In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proven to be a solitary departure
from established law." Id. at 1128.
80 The majority also noted at the outset that, in a suit brought directly against a state, any
difference in the type of relief sought - an important distinction when state officials are sued, see
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-71 (1974) - was irrelevant when the question was whether
the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit that named the state. See Seminole Tribe, r16 S. CL at
1124. This doctrine defies explanation, even though it is surely supported by the Court's case
law. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the district court's injunction against the state and the Board of Corrections
absent Alabama's consent to the filing of such a suit). Why principles that govern suits against
state officials - which largely turn on the nature of the relief sought - are irrelevant simply
because the state (rather than its official) appears on the caption of the complaint is not apparent.
See HART & WECHSLER, sufrla note 12, at 1073 (questioning the justification for making federal
court jurisdiction depend on whether the state or a state officer is the named defendant). The
majority instructed us, however, that this result was necessary "to avoid 'the indignity of subject-
ing a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."' Semi-
nole Tribe, i6 S. CL at 1124 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., 5o6 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
81 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
83 See id. at 1125 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) and Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. i, I9-2o (x989) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
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thority. They had emphasized that congressional authority over In-
dian affairs is plenary; that, unlike the tepid restrictions of the
dormant commerce clause, the Constitution leaves little room for any
independent operation of state law on tribal reservations; and finally,
and perhaps most importantly, that the United States has special re-
sponsibilities to the Indian tribes.8 4 Their efforts to break free from
the chains of Union Gas failed. After rather laconically addressing
some of the arguments advanced,8 5 the majority concluded that, for
Eleventh Amendment purposes, "no principled distinction [can be]
drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Com-
merce Clause."
8 6
That conclusion was the prelude to Union Gas's demise. Even
though the principal dissent of Justice Souter disclaimed any reliance
on Union Gas because of its lack of an authoritative opinion 7 (and,
perhaps more importantly, because the dissent's reasoning differed
considerably from that employed by the Union Gas plurality88 ), the
majority went out of its way to reject Union Gas.89 The majority ac-
knowledged, as the dissents insisted, that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment itself did not literally apply,90 but the majority empha-
sized that "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are pos-
tulates which limit and control."91 The Eleventh Amendment simply
confirmed a "background principle" of state sovereign immunity in
existence at the time of the framing of the Constitution, a principle
that Congress cannot abrogate.
9 2
The Court then held that there was also no available remedy for
the tribe against the Governor under IGRA:
84 See Brief for Petitioner at 12-23, 3-36, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22-30, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12).
85 See Seminole Tribe, ii6 S. Ct. at 1126.
86 Id. at 1127.
87 See id. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88 Compare id. at 1145-85 (focusing on federal question jurisdiction in the Eleventh Amend-
ment context), with Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 13-23 (focusing on the Interstate Commerce Clause as
abrogating the immunity of states).
89 The majority noted that the Union Gas plurality "reached [its] result without an expressed
rationale agreed upon by a majority of the Court," Seminole Tibe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127; the deci-
sion "created confusion among the lower courts that have sought to understand and apply the
deeply fractured decision," id.; and the plurality's rationale "deviated sharply from [the Court's]
established federalism jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated our decision in Hans" by con-
verting it into no more than a clear statement requirement, id. The Court added that the effect
of Union Gas was to allow Congress to expand the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts beyond
what was permitted by Article E[I (the limited Fourteenth Amendment exception notwithstand-
ing). See id. at 1127-28. Finally, the Court noted that Justice Souter's dissent made no effort to
defend the decision in Union Gas. See id. at 1128.
90 See id. at 1122, 1129.
91 Id. at 1129 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
92 Id. at 1131.
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Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a
particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused
to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary .... Here,
of course, the question is not whether a remedy should be created, but
instead is whether the Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted, as it
was in Ex parte Young, in order to allow a suit against a state officer.
Nevertheless, we think that the same general principle applies . . .9
Finding that Congress had not created a claim for relief against state
officials, and refusing to imply one on its own, the Court found that the




Justice Stevens's dissent reiterated the essentials of Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.9s Much of Jus-
tice Stevens's dissent consisted of meticulous analyses of Justice
Iredell's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia and of the majority opinion in
Hans v. Louisiana, through which he sought to show that neither
opinion had erected a constitutional foundation for sovereign immu-
nity.96 Justice Stevens insisted that the Court's "fundamental error"
was "its failure to acknowledge that its modern embodiment of the
ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity 'has absolutely nothing to do
with the limit on judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amend-
ment.'" 97 Although he suggested that, as a matter of stare decisis, he
would adhere to a judge-made federal common law doctrine of sover-
eign immunity,98 that common law doctrine could not bar Congress
from abrogating state immunity when it clearly expressed its intention
to do so. 99
Joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Souter wrote a
thorough dissent.'0 0  After disclaiming any reliance upon Union
93 Id. at 1132.
94 See id.
95 473 U.S. 234 (1985). Although Justice Stevens had joined the Atascadero dissent, he ac-
knowledged that reasonable people could conclude that the text of the Eleventh Amendment
might bar even federal question actions brought against a state by noncitizens. See Seminole
Tribe, ix6 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96 See Seminole Tribe, x6 S. Ct at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1136 ("There
is a special irony in the fact that the error committed by the Chisholm majority was its decision
that this Court, rather than Congress, should define the scope of the sovereign immunity de-
fense."). Justice Stevens also insisted that "Monaco is a most inapt precedent for the majority's
holding today," id. at I39, because that "case concerned a purely state law question to which the
State had interposed a federal defense," id.
97 Id. at x142 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25 (x989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
98 See id. at I42-44.
99 See id. at 1144.
100 Justice Souter's dissent, which was both exhaustive and exhausting, surveyed materials that
no litigant had called to the Court's attention. See id. at 1145-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Gas,10 1 Justice Souter silently rejected the plurality's reasoning in that
case and instead endorsed a version of the Atascadero dissent.10 2 In a
bold move, he attacked Hans directly,10 3 employing a lengthy analysis
of the historical origins of sovereign immunity, numerous citations to
commentators' analyses of the reception of the English common law
into the United States, and a discussion of the nature of "We the Peo-
ple" who founded the Constitution. 0 4 Justice Souter concluded that
the Eleventh Amendment bars litigation based on the status of the
parties only - and only when they are suing on non-federal claims.
The amendment, he argued, has no applicability to Article III federal
question jurisdiction. 0 5 Like Justice Stevens, Justice Souter concluded
that Hans could be preserved as a matter of stare decisis 0 6 but that it
had no applicability when Congress clearly intended to abrogate state
immunity.
0 7
Justice Souter further argued that, even if the Eleventh Amend-
ment shielded the state from suit, the doctrine of Ex parte Young' 08
should provide relief for the tribe against the state Governor. Empha-
sizing the jurisdictional - rather than remedial - nature of the
Young rule, 10 9 Justice Souter maintained that Congress's mentioning of
the word "State" in the statutory scheme should "not limit the possible
defendants to States and is quite literally consistent with the possibil-
ity that a tribe could sue an appropriate state official for a State's
failure to negotiate."" 0
101 See id. at 1145 (noting that Union Gas did not produce a majority opinion). Justice Souter
also may have rejected the Union Gas plurality because he disagreed with its rationale. See supra
note 88 and accompanying text. Abandoning Union Gas troubled Justice Stevens. See Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1142 n.i5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 See id. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103 See id. at 1153-56, 159-78. "A critical examination of [Hans's holding] will show that it
was wrongly decided, as virtually every recent commentator has concluded." Id. at 1153.
104 The majority dismissed Justice Souter's discussion as "disregard[ing] our case law in favor
of a theory cobbled together from law review articles and [the dissent's] own version of historical
events." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1129-3o. According to the majority, Hans was correctly
decided, and, "[flor over a century, we have grounded our decisions in the oft-repeated under-
standing of state sovereign immunity as an essential part of the Eleventh Amendment" Id. at
1129. The majority emphasized post-Hans case law, which, although involving no direct "hold-
ings," radiated Hans's conception of sovereign immunity. See id. at 1130. "When an opinion
issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to
that result by which we are bound." Id. at 1129. Justice Souter attacked this reliance on prece-
dent by insisting not only that Hans did not deal with the power of Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, but also that "[t]he exact rationale to which the majority refers, unfortu-
nately, is not easy to discern." Id. at i156 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105 See Seminole Tribe, ii6 S. Ct. at iSO (Souter, J., dissenting).
106 See id. at i159.
107 See id. at 1159-60.
108 209 U.S. 123 (I908).
109 See Seminole Tribe, I6 S. Ct. at 1182, 1184 (Souter, J., dissenting) C'Young did not estab-
lish a new cause of action .. . . It stands, instead, for a jurisdictional rule . . ").
110 Id. at 1183. In this regard, Justice Souter analogized IGRA to the federal habeas corpus
regime under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires "'the State,' by 'order directed to an appropriate
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V. OTHER POSSIBLE AVENUES
Had the Court forgone the path that it chose to pursue, other ave-
nues - leading either to affirmance or reversal - would have been
available to provide the Court with a firmer foundation upon which to
base a decision than did the logic of Hans. First, the Court could
have recognized Indian tribes as independent sovereigns, thus placing
them outside the scope of the Eleventh Amendment's text. Second,
the Court could have distinguished between the Indian and Interstate
Commerce Clauses on the basis of their different histories and pur-
poses. (This option would have postponed the fight over Union Gas.)
Finally, the Court could have reached the same result (with the same
states' rights rhetoric) by looking to the Tenth Amendment implica-
tions of IGRA."n
A. Indian Tribes as "Independent Sovereigns"
The status of the plaintiffs could have been an important factor in
Seminole Tribe. In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak," 2 an In-
dian tribe argued that, whatever the status of suits by individuals
against states, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had no applicability
to suits by "sovereigns against sovereigns."' 1 3 Hans notwithstanding,
suits against a state can be maintained by the United States and by
sister states. In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,"4 the Court
explained that the first exception was "inherent in the constitutional
plan";" 5 the second was "essential to the peace of the Union" and a
"necessary feature in the formation of a more perfect Union."" 6 How-
State official,' to produce the state court record if an indigent habeas petitioner argues that a state
court's factual findings are not fairly supported in the record." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)
(1994)). This analogy, however, is suspect because the federal habeas statute mentions an order
directed to a state official, and because habeas corpus claims have historically been understood as
suits against the warden. Congress's directive to sue a "State" under IGRA lacks that text and
history and was therefore properly construed to mean a suit against the state, but not against
state officers.
111 Respondents asserted such an objection based on the Tenth Amendment before the Elev-
enth Circuit, but the court refused to consider it because it had been raised for the first time on
appeal. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, ii F.3d ioi6, ioig n.2 (iith Cir. x994). The Supreme
Court followed the same path, see Seminole Tribe, zx6 S. Ct. at 1126 n.xo, even though, in princi-
ple (albeit an increasingly diminishing one), respondents could defend the judgment on any
ground consistent with the record. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. CL 873,
88o n.5 (z996).
112 5o U.S. 775 (1991).
13 Id. at 780. On the distinctive aspects of tribal immunity from suit, see Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978). On the shrinking idea of tribal sovereignty, see L. Scott
Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 8o9,
889-94 (1996), which argues that the consent paradigm is replacing older, territorial conceptions
of tribal sovereignty.
114 292 U.S. 313 (I934).
115 Id. at 329.
116 Id. at 328-29; accord Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (following Principality of Monaco and stating that the
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ever, the Principality of Monaco Court went on to hold that this rea-
soning would not justify suits by foreign nations against individual
states. 117 The tribe in Blatchford insisted that Principality of Monaco
was distinguishable because Indian tribes were "more like States than
foreign sovereigns.""" The Court rejected the analogy:
What makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit by sister States
plausible is the mutuality of that concession. There is no such mutuality
with either foreign sovereigns or Indian tribes .... [I]f the convention
could not surrender the tribes' immunity for the benefit of the States, we
do not believe that it surrendered the States' immunity for the benefit of
the tribes. 119
In Blatchford, however, the Court did not have to decide whether
Congress could abrogate immunity - finding instead that Congress had
not shown an "unmistakably clear intent" to do So. 1 20 In Seminole
Tribe, the United States argued that Congress could abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity, at least in situations implicating the rights of another
sovereign - in this case, an Indian tribe. 121 None of the three opinions
in Seminole Tribe mentioned this argument. Yet, to my mind, this argu-
ment is a persuasive one, and one that the historic approach to state
sovereign immunity could readily have absorbed.
B. The Different Natures of the Indian and Interstate Commerce
Clauses
In Seminole Tribe, the tribe argued that the existence of the Indian
Commerce Clause, as well as the fact that the Eleventh Amendment
mentions nothing about suits by Indian tribes, meant that there was
an implicit constitutional understanding that the Eleventh Amendment
should not bar such suits:
Added now is another facet - the Indian Commerce Clause. "The rela-
tion of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States,
both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States
has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character." The
relation of the Indian Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment
existence of a waiver of state immunity against suits by the United States and other states is
inherent in the constitutional plan).
117 See Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330-31. Suits against county and other local gov-
ernment subdivisions are also excepted. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
118 Blatchford, 5o U.S. at 782.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 786 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (i989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court avoided directly confronting the issue of congressional abrogation in Blatch-
ford by holding that the judicial "clear statement" requirement was not satisfied, meaning that
Congress's intention to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity was far from unambiguous. See
id. at 786-88. The Court also refused to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1362, the grant of federal jurisdic-
tion in cases involving Indian tribes, to effectuate a bypass of state sovereign immunity. See id.
at 783-84.




need not be anomalous or complex. The plain language of the Eleventh
Amendment excludes tribes. The plain language and history of the In-
dian Commerce Clause supports a surrender of state sovereignty. Hans
v. Louisiana need not, and does not, preclude the Seminole Tribe's fed-
eral court suit against the State of Florida.
122
Evolution of doctrine in the sovereign immunity context has oc-
curred, as in other areas of constitutional law, in the common law
mode. 1 23  Given the fact that the language of the amendment does not
forbid federal court jurisdiction, and that the Indian Commerce Clause
has been interpreted elsewhere as giving Congress plenary authority with
respect to the Indian tribes,' 24 the Court could have readily accommo-
dated the interests of the tribe in a very narrow holding based on the
Indian Commerce Clause while saving the Union Gas fight for another
day.'
2 9
Unfortunately, in sweeping away arguments based on the special na-
ture of Indian tribes, the Court once again posited an intractable "there-
ness" of an historical and unyielding principle of state sovereign
immunity. The Court's approach perpetuates the belief that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is an historical given, an article of faith incapable
of and not needing justification, neither as to its existence nor as to its
scope. 126 In our time, however, state sovereign immunity is largely a
body of judge-made law. "Hans v. Louisiana and Ex parte Young have
forged powerful doctrines; the latter an acknowledged fiction, the former
constructed on language which does not support its scope.' 27 Prece-
dents have "accreted" and the Eleventh Amendment is now "barnacled
with case law."' 28 Case law, however, is a process of accommodating
competing interests, and the special nature of the Indian tribes and the
122 Brief for Petitioner at 36, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12) (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Kagama, IuS U.S. 375, 381 (i886)). Another argument raised by the tribe and the
United States was that the Indian tribes were a "special charge" or "dependency" of the United
States. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24, Seminole TVibe
(No. 94-12). This argument draws upon an analogy to a qui tam action which, it was argued,
would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id.
123 See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 393 (98).
This common law approach, however, should never go so far that the doctrine is irreconcilable
with the text - the approach taken by the Court in Hans (and in Seminole Tribe). See id.
124 See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
12S Although less defensible, the Court could also have taken the position of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit - simply confining Union Gas to the Interstate Commerce Clause and finding no abrogation
possible under the Indian Commerce Clause. Such a result would undoubtedly have seemed
anomalous and would generally have signaled that Union Gas's days were numbered, but it
would have avoided the overruling of Union Gas until the question was squarely before the
Court.
126 For a dramatic recent example of this mindset, see United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754 (Ist
Cir. 1994), overturning the district court's imposition of fees and costs on the United States for
prosecutorial misconduct. For the court of appeals, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
"mandatory and absolute," id. at 764, and "must be applied mechanically, come what may," id.
127 Brief for Petitioner at 36, Seminole Tibe (No. 94-I2).
128 Shapiro, supra note iS, at 6i. Although it overturned Union Gas, Seminole Tribe left most
of the important case law in place.
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unique nature of the congressional power under the Indian Commerce
Clause could readily have moved the tribe past the Eleventh Amend-
ment bar.
C. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment may have provided a more secure founda-
tion for the Court's federalism concerns with IGRA.12 9 Although not
free from controversy, the "anti-commandeering" doctrine of New York
v. United States13 0 is much more defensible on textual, structural and
historical grounds than Hans. IGRA speaks specifically to states and
orders them to bargain with Indian tribes. It seemingly rearranges
state lawmaking authority by superseding the Florida state law that
requires legislative approval of Indian tribe compacts.' 3 ' In that sense
it looks like a directive to a state legislature to ratify a court-initiated
compact. (Could Congress provide that a governor's consent alone
was a sufficient state commitment for the purposes of federal law?)
Moreover, even if state law allowed a governor alone to conclude a
compact, federal "commandeering" of a state's executive process raises
political accountability questions similar to those that were raised in
New York.' 3 2  Finally, IGRA interferes with the state's judicial pro-
129 The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. In New York v. United States, 5o5 U.S. I44 (1992), the Court
explained its Tenth Amendment concerns as follows:
The Tenth Amendment ... restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived
from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which ... is essentially a tautology. Instead,
the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to
limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment
thus directs us to determine ... whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a
limitation on an Article I power.
Id. at 156-57.
130 See New York, 5o5 U.S. at i61-66.
131 Florida argued that, "[i]f the legislature assumed the role of negotiator with the Tribes, the
Legislature could not be sued under Ex parte Young because the Legislature is unquestionably
'the State."' Brief of Respondents at 32, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12). This claim is exaggerated;
the legislature is no more "the state" than is the executive or the Florida Supreme Court. Cf.
Quern v. Jordan, 44o U.S. 332, 355 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce its prohibitions whether they be
disregarded by the legislative, executive or judicial branches of the state); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 286 (I9M3) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment is "addressed, of
course, to the States, but also to every person whether natural or juridical who is the repository of
state power").
132 The Court will have an opportunity to address the issue of federal commandeering of state
law enforcement mechanisms in the 1996 Term. On June 18, 1996, the Court granted certiorari in
Prints v. United States and Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2995), cert. granted,
1z6 S. Ct. 2522 (I996), to review a Ninth Circuit determination that the 1993 Brady Handgun
Violence Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 207 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at i8 U.S.C. § 922(S)
(1994)), could validly require state and local law enforcement officials to make "reasonable efforts"
to ascertain whether prospective handgun buyers are legally disqualified from possessing hand-
guns. See Recent Case, 2o9 HARv. L. Rv. 2833, 2838 (2996) ("[Tlhe textual and structural un-
derpinnings of our federal system suggest that under the New York rule, courts should hold
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cess: federal court resolution of what state gaming law permitted
would raise complex problems involving the interface of such interpre-
tations with subsequent interpretations by the state courts. 33
VI. RHETORIC
The Supreme Court, however, chose to defend its result on the
"background postulates" of "inherent state sovereignty." Why? Per-
haps the Court's reasoning reflects a visceral feeling among the major-
ity of the Court that the role of the states in our federal structure has
been so diminished as to become unintelligible. This feeling would
generate an instinctive reaction to protect - indeed, to create - a
role for the states, even if that role became merely symbolic. One can
readily understand this majority's Tenth Amendment concerns. The
concept of a national government of limited powers was an important
and pervasive aspect of the original understanding both in the Consti-
tutional Convention and in the ratification debates. 34 And defining
federal co-optation of the states' enforcement mechanisms .. . unconstitutional.'); see also
ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1392-94 (5th Cir.) (holding that the Lead Contamination
Control Act violates the Tenth Amendment by requiring states to establish programs for removal
of lead contaminants from schools and day care centers), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 311o
(U.S. July 22, 1996) (No. 96-174). For a criticism of the Brady Act on policy grounds, see James
B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the "Wrong" Hands: The Brady Law and
the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 101-04 (1995).
133 The United States, however, sought to salvage the entire act by claiming that IGRA was
simply an example of conditional preemption. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at I7, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12). The states were invited to participate,
and if they did not, the only "penalty" suffered was the forfeit of any role in the regulation of
Indian gaming. Assuming that this kind of legislation is valid, the submission of the United
States is not a fair description of IGRA. Indeed, the government made that clear when, in re-
sponding to a claim that Ex parte Young did not involve discretionary duties, it emphasized the
"mandatory" character of the duty to negotiate in good faith. See id. at 16. Respondents cor-
recty argued that the United States sought to have it both ways. See Brief of Respondents at
33-34, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12).
134 In the Constitutional Convention, moderate nationalists ensured a constitutional plan in
which the states would play a vital role. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. II, 139-47 (996). For an
excellent study of the subject, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 57-93 (r996). After describing the debates over represen-
tation in the Senate and in the House of Representatives, see id. at 57-83, Rakove states that,
"[i]n the end, the framers could not avoid treating the states as constitutional elements of the
polity; nor could they deny that simple residence in a state would establish the most natural bond
of civic loyalty." Id. at 78. In addition, the state-centered and countermajoritarian amendment
process of Article V was designed to make alterations in the terms of union difficult, notwith-
standing the competing principle that the Constitution must provide for a realistic mechanism for
change. See Monaghan, supra, at 143-46. Nonetheless, during the state ratification debates, fears
of a powerful new "consolidated" national government were widely expressed by the Constitu-
tion's opponents. See RAKOVE, supra, at i81-88; Monaghan, supra, at 147-56. "Federalists" of
all shades (including both Madison and Hamilton, the federalists of The Federalist) countered by
defending the Constitution as creating a national government of only limited powers, thus adopt-
ing the view of the Convention's moderate nationalists. See Monaghan, supra, at 149-51. "Re-
sponding quickly to Anti-Federalist sentiment, the Federalists deflected the state-centered attack
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the proper limits on national power has been an important and con-
tested issue throughout our history, 35 as both the Civil War 3 6 and the
New Deal' 3 7 graphically demonstrate.
Independent of the Tenth Amendment context, however, the major-
ity's Eleventh Amendment federalism concerns are far more difficult
to explain. The Seminole Tribe majority recognized that nothing in
the language of the Eleventh Amendment (or in Article IID bars fed-
eral court suits to enforce federal rights brought against unconsenting
states by their own citizens. 138 However, the majority fell back upon
Principality of Monaco for the proposition that "[b]ehind the words of
the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.'
39
These "postulates" include the notion that controversies must have a
justiciable character and that states are immune from suit without
their consent, except in instances in which such immunity was surren-
dered in the constitutional plan.
40
But even if these "postulates" exist, what is their significance or
role when Congress clearly acts to abrogate state sovereign immunity?
Seminole Tribe acknowledged that, with one exception, the Court had
not applied these postulates to the question of congressional power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, but it concluded that "considera-
tion of that question must proceed with fidelity to this century-old
doctrine.' 41 I believe that the Court rejected clear constitutional text
in preference to unarticulated and debatable historical explanations be-
cause of the power of symbolism. This may have the effect of making
the other, political branches of the federal government - and the peo-
ple - aware that the status of states should be treated with extra care
when constructing future legislation. In this regard, the "advisory
by, in effect, embracing it." Id. at 149. See generally RAKovE, supra, at i88-2oi (discussing the
federalists' theoretical and practical arguments in support of their conception of federalism).
135 For an elegant and wide-ranging exploration and defense of the contemporary importance
of "Our Federalism," see DAviD L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
136 See id. at 28.
137 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. oo, 123-24 (x941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34-38 (1937).
138 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. Seminole Tribe thus continues the general practice,
begun in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (i8go), of relying on the amendment to support an expan-
sive notion of state sovereign immunity, despite acknowledging that the amendment's language
does not provide textual support for such a broad reading. See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
65i, 662-63 (1974) (noting the divergence between the amendment's text and the doctrine).
139 Seminole Tribe, i6 S. Ct at 1129 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 322 (1934)); see also id. at 1122 (explaining that the principle of state sovereignty, and the
corollary principle that no state can be sued by an individual without its consent, make up the
two-part "presupposition" underpinning the text of the Eleventh Amendment). But see id. at IIS2
n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that an appeal to background principles and postulates ordi-
narily cannot overcome the plain meaning of the constitutional text, especially the relatively clear
jurisdictional provisions of Article III).




character" 42 of the Court's opinion may well work as a catalyst for
political and social change.
VII. REALITY
Despite their symbolism, constitutional conceptions of state sover-
eign immunity have no apparent reality. In the main, the Eleventh
Amendment is concerned only with forum selection: should states be
sued in state or federal courts? Although state courts are available -
indeed required - to hear suits against states for the violation of fed-
eral claims, a federal forum also generally remains available for suits
against states via their officers. Therefore, it is only in rare instances
that a state will be unaccountable for its wrongs in any court of law.
A. Defensible Justifications for Sovereign Immunity?
Seminole Tribe relied heavily, if not exclusively, on the principle of
sovereign immunity to support its interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. Although courts and commentators have offered several
justifications for the concept on both functional and historical grounds,
none appears convincing. Indeed, any doctrine of state sovereign im-
munity strains both the traditional conception of the rule of law,
which emphasizes governmental accountability to courts of law,143 and
national supremacy, which generally presumes that Congress can en-
trust enforcement of whatever rights it can validly create to the na-
tional courts. 4 Seminole Tribe offered no functional justification
whatsoever for its vigorous protection of state sovereign immunity; in-
142 Id. at 1145 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note x2, at Io02 ('Many scholars have argued that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it had evolved in England prior to 1789, was less about
whether the Crown or its agents could be sued, than about how."); Shapiro, supra note 15, at 62;
see also Seminole Tribe, i6 S. CL at 1142-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the "question-
able heritage" of the sovereign immunity doctrine and its unsuitability in a democratic nation).
144 The Court established this presumption over i5o years ago:
[The legislative, executive and judicial power of every well constructed government, are
co-extensive with each other; that is, they are potentially co-extensive .... [Article DI]
enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution,
laws and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume
such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it.
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (i824); see also Seminole
Tribe, i6 S. Ct. at 1154 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hans "destroyed the congruence of
judicial power under Article IlI with the substantive guarantees of the Constitution, and with the
provisions of statutes passed by Congress in the exercise of its power under Article I"). However,
in his Union Gas opinion, Justice Scalia countered:
[Tihe Constitution envisions the necessary judicial means to assure compliance with the
Constitution and laws. But since the Constitution does not deem this to require that pri-
vate individuals be able to bring claims against the Federal Government for violation of
the Constitution or laws ... it is difficult to see why it must be interpreted to require that
private individuals be able to bring such claims against the States.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. r, 33-34 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citations omitted), overruled by Seminole Tribe, u16 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
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stead, it chose to rely on the particularly dissatisfying rationale of the
"inherent nature" of a sovereign's immunity from suit.
i. "Inherent" and Historical Rationales for Sovereign Immunity.
As did the Court in Hans, the Seminole Tribe majority cited The Fed-
eralist No. 8z for the proposition that "it is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent."145 The historical conception of "sovereignty" itself is prob-
lematic enough,1 46 but the word "inherent" is both meaningless and
misleading. At least in the context of the historical conception of sov-
ereignty, the word has no content; the "inherent" unamenability of
sovereigns to suit is an attribution made by the writer, not a "prop-
erty" of the "entity" described. In fact, in a democratic republic, it is
not apparent why the presumption is not completely reversed. Should
not accountability to the people - both to the majority at the polls
and to wronged individuals in the courts - be "inherent in the nature
of sovereignty"?
In the early years of the Republic, some justices believed that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was incompatible with our republican
institutions. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 47 Chief Justice Jay expressed
concern that the feudal doctrine of sovereign immunity was antagonis-
tic to the idea that sovereignty resides in the people: 48 "The same
feudal ideas run through all [of Europe's] jurisprudence, and con-
stantly remind us of the distinction between the prince and the sub-
ject. No such ideas obtain here .... ,,'49 Justice Wilson thought the
concept of sovereign immunity conflicted with the rule of law underly-
ing our republican form of government.15 0 Indeed, Justice Wilson be-
lieved that the idea of state sovereignty had an inaccurately symbolic
quality to it: "The states, rather than the people, for whose sakes the
states exist, are frequently the objects which attract and arrest our
principal attention.... Sentiments and expressions of this inaccurate
kind prevail in our common . . . language."' 5 ' The current Court,
however, still clings to these formalistic (or perhaps medieval)
"[s]entiments and expressions" 15 2 of state sovereignty - the same ones
145 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at ii3o-3i n.13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 8i, at 487 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6i)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146 See Monaghan, supra note 134, at 165-69.
147 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (i793).
148 See id. at 470-73 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
149 Id. at 471. "[A]t the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly
the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects ...and have none to
govern but themselves . . . ." Id. at 471-72.
150 See id. at 461-66 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
151 Id. at 462. "A State I cheerfully admit, is the noblest work of man: But man himself, free
and honest, is, I speak as to this world, the noblest work of God." Id. at 463.
152 Id. at 462.
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that Justice Wilson (a member of the Committee on Detail at the Con-
stitutional Convention 5 3) rejected over two hundred years ago.15 4
2. Executive Discretion as a Rationale for Sovereign Immunity. -
Apart from the "inherent" justifications, and the now infrequently
voiced expressions of concern for the public fisc,' 55 a number of schol-
ars have posited that sovereign immunity is necessary to prevent ex-
cessive judicial interference with executive discretion. 5 6 The crux of
this argument is that the government could never accomplish its work
- at least democratically - if its citizens were continually forcing it
into court to account for its actions.'5 7 Of course, the "executive dis-
cretion" rationale does not explain why immunity is in fact the excep-
tion rather than the rule, or even why other measures - such as
limiting the damages available in suits against the sovereign - would
not be equally effective. Instead of offering any empirical proof, the
partisans of this argument assert its validity without considering the
extensive areas in which a sovereign has consented to liability and has
still been able to carry out the democratic will. In the federal context,
for example, Congress has extensively waived sovereign immunity for
the United States.',5  Congress and the courts have never let the im-
munity of the United States present a significant litigation barrier, ex-
153 See Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis,
47 MINN. L. REV. 53, 57 n.20 (x962).
154 This sovereignty rhetoric seems particularly pointless in the waiver context, in which the
Court has insisted that waivers of sovereign immunity be strictly construed. For example, last
Term in Lane v. Pena, ii6 S. Ct. 2092 (1996), the Court, by a 7-2 majority, held that the United
States had not waived its sovereign immunity to a damage claim based upon an executive
agency's violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its amendment. See id. at 21oo. The
Court acknowledged that the petitioner's various arguments had "superficial appeal," id. at 2o96,
and were "not without some force," id. at 2oo, and that "[the statutory scheme on which [peti-
tioner] hinge[d] his argument is admittedly somewhat bewildering," id. at 2o98. The Court, how-
ever, rejected any finding of waiver because there was no waiver "unequivocally expressed in
statutory text," and because "a waiver ... [must] be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in
favor of the sovereign." Id. at 2o96; see also John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity
in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, i995 Vs. L. REV. 771, 776-8o (arguing that this harsh
doctrine as applied to the federal government's waivers only took firm hold in i9gi).
155 For a rare defense of sovereign immunity as a legislative trade-off between compensation
for litigants and other legitimate demands on the public fisc, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legis-
lative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, ioi HARV. L. REv. 916, 937 (988).
Whatever the merits of this argument, protection of the public fisc certainly did not appear to be
a major concern of the Court in Seminole Tribe (after all, did the state not stand to gain money
for its treasury if it had concluded a compact?), or in the i995 Term. See United States v. Win-
star Corp., i6 S. Ct. 2432, 2472 (1996) (deciding a contract dispute claim against the United
States even though the government's potential liability ran into the billions of dollars).
156 Professor Woolhandler describes this as a "discretion" model of sovereign immunity, the
purpose of which is to protect "the decisionmaking processes of the official." Ann Woolhandler,
Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 398 (1987). As
others have observed, sovereign immunity is a heavy, "blunt" tool for allaying such concerns. See,
e.g., Shapiro, supra note I5, at 79.
157 See Woolhandler, supra note I56, at 411.
158 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994); Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 1491 (1994); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1994).
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cept in suits for money damages.' s 9 The difference between holding
the United States liable and holding a state liable (on a federal claim)
is, therefore, a question of judicial federalism - whether states should
be held liable for federal claims in federal court - rather than one of
the merits of sovereign immunity itself.
B. Reich and the Availability of State Courts
In large measure, the Eleventh Amendment operates only as a fo-
rum selection clause. Because the Eleventh Amendment doctrine pro-
hibits federal claims against states sued in their own name from being
heard in federal court, it necessitates that plaintiffs either recast their
claims as suits against state officers or bring them in state court. In
Reich v. Collins,160 decided in the 1994 Term, a unanimous Court
made clear that state courts must provide adequate relief when state
officials deprive persons of their property in violation of federal law,
irrespective of "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in
their own courts."' 61 Congress may now be forced to remove certain
suits against unconsenting states from exclusive federal jurisdiction,
perhaps in areas such as copyright and bankruptcy. 62 In this way,
159 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 1027-41. In 1976, Congress waived sovereign
immunity in suits seeking relief other than money damages against federal agencies and officials,
and specifically authorized naming the United States as a defendant. See Pub. L. No. 94-574, § i,
90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (r976) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 702); HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 1036-39.
But cf. Lane v. Pena, ii6 S. Ct. 2092, 2100 (i996) (holding that Congress did not waive sovereign
immunity in a damage suit under § 5o4(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Nestor M. Davidson,
Note, Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the Human Radiation Experiments, 96
COLUm. L. REV. 1203, 12o6-26 (x996) (discussing the significant gaps in the scope of governmen-
tal waivers in the tort context).
160 H5 S. Ct. 547 (i994).
161 Id. at 549. To the extent that the Court "suggested" in a footnote, see Seminole Tribe, 1i6
S. Ct. at 1131 n.r4, that state "consent" is necessary to suit in state court, see HART & WECHSLER
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 12, at 46, the suggestion is plainly wrong. However, the relief that the
state courts must provide in such cases is not necessarily a money judgment. In tax refund cases,
such as Reich, the state may satisfy its constitutional duty by retroactively eliminating any imper-
missible discrimination. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 850-52. Of course, in claims
for damages, a suit in state court is ordinarily cast against state officials, not the state, such that
state sovereignty issues may not be implicated at all. See, e.g., Reich, 115 S. Ct. at 547. Nonethe-
less, suits against "the state" and state-wide entities are not uncommon. See, e.g., Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 6o9, 612-14 (r98i) (coal producers and some of their utility
customers suing the state in state court for refunds of severance taxes).
162 See Susan D. Raively, Note, Copyright Infringement Suits Against States: Is the Eleventh
Amendment a Valid Defense?, 6 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 501, 504 (x988) ("If the Supreme
Court maintains its current policy of upholding eleventh amendment immunity, a state could
plead the eleventh amendment and not be sued for copyright infringement.'). Copyright presents
the most salient illustration. A copyright is property and, as such, is protected by federal legisla-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference. Due to infringements at the state
university level, Congress amended federal copyright law to ensure that copyrightholders could
sue state entities. See Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749
(r99o) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 5o(a), 51, ('994)). The Fifth Circuit sustained the legislation on
the authority of Union Gas, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Seminole
Tribe. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded,
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the federal government may come to rely upon state courts, with the
possibility of Supreme Court review, 163 to enforce these federal rights
against the states.
164
C. The Continuing Vitality of Ex Parte Young
Ex parte Young 165 long ago confirmed that citizens seeking pro-
spective relief in suits against "the state" could simply recast their
complaints as suits against state officials166 and bring them in federal
court, "notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself."
1 67
116 S. Ct x667 (i996). Given the exclusive nature of federal court jurisdiction, a copyright plain-
tiff cannot sue state entities in state court and hope to rely on the line of authority that requires a
state to provide effective redress for impairing a federally created property right.
The Seminole Tribe majority, however, was entirely untroubled by these concerns. It pointed
out, in footnotes, that prospective relief against state officials to ensure future compliance with
federal law is available under Ex parte Young, see Seminole Tribe, xx6 S. CL at 1I3 n1.4, but
that "there is no established tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of [copy-
right laws] against the States." Id. at i3x n.16. Possible solutions may be that Congress could
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment or authorize qui tam actions on behalf of the United States by
private copyright holders. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REv. 539, 556-64 (x995); cf. HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 12, at 316-22 (suggesting state capacity to sue based on parens patriae claims for
relief). Whether the Seminole Tibe majority would permit so transparent an evisceration of its
holdings is unclear. Congress could, of course, amend the statute to remove the federal court
exclusivity bar when the state is a defendant, or when the state treasury is expected to make
payment. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (i986) ("Relief that in essence serves to com-
pensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official ... that was illegal under
federal law is barred even when the state official is the named defendant."). If a federal proceed-
ing resulted in a determination of liability, normal preclusion principles would take hold; thus, the
state court could not redetermine the liability determination or the amount of damages. Congress
might also be able to grant federal courts the power to stay the state court proceeding to ensure
that federal courts make liability determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (i994).
163 See supra note 18.
164 See, e.g., Reich, ii5 S. Ct. at 549; Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 21-23
(1920); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-28 (19o8).
165 208 U.S. 123 (i9o8). It is important to note that although this doctrine is often referred to
as the Ex parte Young doctrine, Young did not "establish" the doctrine. It simply reconciled, or
rationalized, the Court's prior precedents. See id. at i5o--6o (reviewing prior cases in which the
Court attempted to discern whether the suit in question had been brought against the state or one
of its officials). Young's author, Justice Peckham, also wrote Lochner v. New York, x98 U.S. 45
(i9o5). Although Lochner established the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for suit against state
economic legislation, Young ensured an adequate judicial mechanism for such suits by limiting the
applicability of Eleventh Amendment immunity in certain instances. However, Young took pains
to make clear that it was not sacrificing the Eleventh Amendment for the sake of the Fourteenth:
"We may assume that each exists in full force, and that we must give to the Eleventh Amendment
all the effect it naturally would have, without cutting it down or rendering its meaning any more
narrow than the language, fairly interpreted, would warrant" Young, 209 U.S. at iso. As dis-
cussed below, it seems quite clear that Young effected a substantial limitation on Eleventh
Amendment immunity, notwithstanding Justice Peckham's opinion to the contrary.
166 See Young, 209 U.S. at 149-5o. The opinion's opening sentence stated that the Court un-
derstood fully the "great importance of the case, not only to the parties now before the court, but
also to the great mass of the citizens of this country." Id. at 142.
167 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 (2984) (construing Young).
However, Pennhurst repudiated decades of settled understanding and held that the Young doc-
trine does not apply to (and thus the Eleventh Amendment bars) suits against state officials to
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Young sapped state sovereign immunity of any real bite, leaving only a
narrow domain within which to operate. 168 Young's well-known fic-
tion is that, when a state official violates valid federal law, he is
"stripped of his official or representative character and [is] subjected in
his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."1 69 Everyone
now recognizes that nothing but a fiction is involved,170 one designed,
as the Court subsequently recognized, "to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the
supreme authority of the United States." 7 ' Young is "an exception"
(a massive, judge-made exception) to the Eleventh Amendment.
72
To characterize Young as an exception, however, gets matters
nearly backward: the Eleventh Amendment is an exception to
Young.173 Because Young explicitly proceeded on the premise that the
Fourteenth Amendment had not narrowed the Eleventh Amend-
ment,' 74 the Court's reasoning extended to the prospective vindication
compel their compliance with state law. See id. at io3-o6. In the Pennhurst Court's view, be-
cause a federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law does not
vindicate the supreme authority of federal law, and because such an action represents a great
intrusion on a state's sovereignty, the justification for the Young doctrine "disappears" in the
context of state law. See id. at io6. See generally Shapiro, supra note 15, at 84-85 (criticizing
Pennhurst for approaching the sovereign immunity doctrine with an unjustified deference and for
substantially limiting the accountability of government officials to individuals harmed by a viola-
tion of state law).
168 The narrow domain consists, inter alia, of suits that for some reason cannot be recast
against a state official, see Seminole Tribe, 1i6 S. Ct. at 1132; suits in which the official's duty is
only discretionary, see Young, 209 U.S. at 158; suits in which the only remedy requested is retro-
spective money damages that would be paid from the state treasury, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 65i, 664-71 (i974); and suits against a state official for a violation of state law, see
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at io3-o6. (In the second example, the doctrine is, of course, unnecessary.)
169 Young, 209 U.S. at i6o. The Eleventh Amendment thus did not bar a suit against a state
officer:
The answer to all this is the same as made in every case where an official claims to be
acting under the authority of the State. The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitu-
tional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to
the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act
upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to
enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional.
Id. at i59.
170 Although some have recognized "a fictive quality" inherent in the Young doctrine, CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD M. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 3524, at 154 (2d ed. 1984), it is, on the contrary, a "fiction that there ever existed a broad
doctrine of sovereign immunity that, outside of a few specific areas, barred relief at the behest of
individuals complaining of government illegality." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at
1015-16.
171 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at io5 (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at i6o). Professor Shapiro has indi-
cated that the fiction might be a "silver lining" that prevents a troublesome enlargement of sover-
eign immunity. Shapiro, supra note IS, at 84-85.
172 Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 5o6 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
"The doctrine of Ex parte Young ... is regarded as carving out a necessary exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity." Id.
173 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at iox5-i6.
174 See supra note i65.
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of all federal rights, including rights created under Article I, Section 8.
The law reports are, accordingly, full of suits against public officials to
enforce federal statutory rights. 75 Seminole Tribe will have no signifi-
cant impact on the actual authority of federal courts to enforce these
federal laws prospectively against states in suits by private persons. In
Seminole Tribe, the tribe named the Governor of Florida as an addi-
tional defendant;17 6 both the tribe and the United States relied heavily
on Young. 17 7 Indeed, the United States opened its argument with a
discussion of Young's applicability to the case and suggested that the
Court need not even address the issue of the state's suability.
78
Although the Seminole Tribe majority ultimately found Young inappli-
cable, 179 the Court gave no indication that it intended to question
Young. Quite to the contrary, the majority reaffirmed Young in several
instances.' 80 Thus, the Court's opinion should not radiate much un-
certainty in the Young context.' 8 '
Yet Seminole Tibe's majority, despite professing fidelity to Young,
did find Young to be something of a public relations problem. If the
suit could be maintained against the Governor but not against the
state, then when all was said and done the Court's sharp divisions
over sovereign immunity concerned only the caption on the tribe's
complaint. 82 Confronted with Young, the Eleventh Circuit had as-
serted that Young did not authorize suits to force an official "to under-
take a discretionary task."1 83 The court of appeals stressed that
governors had discretion under IGRA not only over the content of a
175 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65r, 653 (1974).
176 See Seminole Tribe, 1i6 S. CL at I121.
177 See Brief for Petitioner at 23-31, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12-I9, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12).
178 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12-19, Seminole
Tribe (No. 94-12); id. at ig n.5.
179 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
180 See id. at r131 nn.14 & i6, 1133 n.17.
181 Hopefully, the Court will reassert the validity of Young in Coeur d'Alene Tibe v. Idaho, 42
F.3d 1244 (9 th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, I16 S. Ct 1415 (z996), which involves a suit against the
state and state officials by individuals who assert a federal claim to possession or ownership of
property and who seek to quiet title in the tribe to beds, banks and waters of all navigable water
courses within the 1873 boundaries of the tribe's reservation. See id. at 1247. The district court
dismissed the tribe's complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed dismissal with respect to the
state. See id. at 1247-48. The court of appeals also held that the state officials could be required
to comply with federal law for the future. See id. at 1251. For a discussion of the possible
preclusive effect in state court of federal court determinations of state liability, see note 162
above.
182 Cf David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, z984 SuP.
CT. REv. 149, 151 n.hi ("People are not likely to amend constitutions just to change captions on
complaints.").
183 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, ii F.3d io16, 1028 (i1th Cir. 1994) (citing Young, 209 U.S. at
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potential compact but also (it believed) over whether to bargain at
all.' 8
4
The discretion argument bristles with difficulties. At the remedial
stage, for example, state implementation of federal court decrees often
assumes the exercise of significant discretion by state officials.'
8 5
Framed, however, in terms of the underlying substantive obligation,
the discretion argument becomes more attractive: the negotiating
"duty" IGRA imposed is, as respondents suggested, too indefinite in
nature to be capable of judicial enforcement 8 6 If that is so, IGRA
would violate Article III's case or controversy requirement, not the
Eleventh Amendment.
8 7
Before the Supreme Court, respondents relied upon the Eleventh
Circuit's discretion analysis."' The tribe and the United States coun-
tered that there was a federal statutory requirement that the Governor
negotiate in good faith. The Governor had discretion as to the terms
of the compact, not over whether to negotiate.' 8 9 Whatever the merits
of this controversy, the majority avoided it. Instead, drawing on its
Bivens jurisprudence, 190 the Court concluded that Congress intended
IGRA's remedial scheme to be exclusive: "[W]here Congress has pre-
scribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State
of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting
aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer
based upon Ex parte Young." 19 1 Otherwise, the limited duty and the
"quite modest set of sanctions" Congress imposed would be "superflu-
184 See id. at 1028-29. The court of appeals also concluded that IGRA authorized a suit
against the state, rather than an officer, because it did not directly impose duties on any specific
state officer. See id. at 1029. The Young doctrine was thus inapplicable. See id.
18S Legislative redistricting provides a good example. Cf. Vera v. Bush, No. CIV. A. H-94-
0277, 1996 WL 442314, at *12-*3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1996) (ordering interim redistricting of
congressional districts after Texas failed to adopt a remedial redistricting plan despite a Supreme
Court ruling that current voting districts were unconstitutional).
186 See Brief of Respondents at 32-33, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12). Respondents argued that if
the state could refuse to negotiate, willingness to negotiate would itself be discretionary. There-
fore, negotiating "is not a ministerial duty for which a mandatory injunction will lie." Id. at 32.
187 The complaint must assert a claim of right sufficiently definite to be judicially enforceable.
See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430-32 (1987) (holding that
an enforceable right must be "sufficiently specific and definite'; see also Henry Paul Monaghan,
Federal Statutory Review Under Section z983 and the APA, 9i CoLuM. L. REV. 233, 243, 248
(i99i) (comparing the nature of enforceable primary federal statutory rights with those enforcea-
ble under § 1983).
188 See Seminole Tribe, ii F.3d at 1028-29; Brief of Respondents at 31-35, Seminole Tribe
(No. 94-12).
189 See Brief for Petitioner at 25-29, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-17, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12).
190 In Bivens, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to money damages from federal
officers for injuries resulting from federal agents' Fourth Amendment breach. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
191 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. CL at 1132.
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ous" because Young provided "more complete and more immediate re-
lief," including sanctions for contempt. 192
At first blush, the Seminole Tribe Court's analysis of Young is un-
convincing. 193 Surely Congress would prefer some federal court rem-
edy to no remedy.194 And why should Young necessarily entail a
remedial scheme different from IGRA's? Jurisdiction to hear (which
Young helps to secure by removing the Eleventh Amendment bar) and
the appropriate remedy, once jurisdiction is exercised, result from dif-
ferent inquiries. IGRA could be read to define the scope of the avail-
able rights and remedies. Yet this analysis might raise a further
problem, namely, the extent to which Congress can eliminate the con-
tempt power once it decides to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts. 195 Or is the response that no "contempt" could occur because
the duty to negotiate was, as the United States said, a "conditional
one"?1
9 6
The majority was correct in rejecting an underlying action against
the Governor in Seminole Tribe, although I would put its point differ-
ently: the suit against the Governor failed to state a claim for relief.
97
To see why, we must return to Young itself. Simplified, Young in-
volved railroad shareholders seeking to enjoin the state attorney gen-
eral from enforcing state railroad rates on the ground that they were
confiscatory.' 9  State law precluded any other effective way to make
such a challenge. 99 Young did more than simply rationalize the
Court's prior precedents limiting state sovereign immunity; it also nec-
essarily assumed the existence of an implied right of action for equita-
ble relief against state officials. This right was grounded in the
192 Id. at 1132-33.
193 Though the Court may have been concerned that a federal court might have held the Gov-
ernor in contempt for following state law, Young creates the same predicament.
194 See HART & WECHSLER SUPPLEMENT, supra note i2, at 47.
195 "Courts invested with the judicial power of the United States have certain inherent author-
ity to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional re-
sponsibilities." Degen v. United States, ix6 S. Ct. 1777, 1780 (1996).
196 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at x7, Seminole Twbe
(No. 94-I2).
197 Justice Souter's dissent acknowledged that Young could be limited in actions based on fed-
eral statutes, but he vigorously denied that IGRA had done so. See Seminole Tribe, xx6 S. Ct. at
ii8o-8i (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that "[n]o clear statement of intent to dis-
place the doctrine of Ex parte Young occurs in IGRA." Id. at i18i. He also claimed that Con-
gress could not "possibly have intended to jeopardize the enforcement of the statute by excluding
application of Young's traditional jurisdictional rule." Id. at 1184. He objected to any doctrine of
implied congressional displacement of Young. See id. at i8o. Justice Souter's approach, how-
ever, would cause a dramatic shift in the Court's jurisprudence; the Court apparently would have
to return to the days before Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), see infra note
203, when it regularly inferred causes of action from statutes. Such a change is unwarranted. In
promulgating IGRA, Congress was aware of its obligation to create a remedy; still, it chose not to
act to give a claim for relief against state officials. Given this legal landscape, it is not clear
under Justice Souter's reasoning how Congress would not create a remedy if it wished.
198 See Young, 209 U.S. at 145-47.
199 See id.
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Constitution; the Court thereby established the existence of "arising-
under" jurisdiction.20 0  Whether the right of action was created by the
Constitution itself or was simply a matter of constitutional common
law need not be explored here.20 1 This portion of Young, however, is
not relevant when a suit is based on a federal statute, nor are Bivens
and its progeny, except by way of analogy. The crucial issue in Semi-
nole Tribe was whether the tribe stated a cognizable statutory claim
for relief against the Governor. Even if IGRA imposed a concrete
duty on the Governor and established a "primary right" in the tribe, a
right of action against the Governor must exist to sustain a lawsuit.
20 2
IGRA creates no such privately enforceable remedial right of action,
either expressly or by implication. 203 Given the Court's current aver-
sion to inferring causes of action in statutes, Congress's failure to cre-
ate an express private right of action against state officials implies that
Congress did not intend there to be one. Moreover, albeit more tenu-
ously, IGRA can also be interpreted as foreclosing use of § 1983 to
provide the requisite remedial right.
20 4
200 See id. at 145 (declaring that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the case because "it
involved the decision of Federal questions arising under the Constitution of the United States");
cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at xo65 (questioning whether the Young court "recognized
a judicially implied federal cause of action for injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment"). There was no diversity jurisdiction in Young. See Young, 209 U.S. at 143.
201 Cf. Monaghan, supra note 27, at 23-25 (arguing that Bivens is an example of constitutional
common law). In the absence of "an exclusive federal remedy that is as effective as the fullest
state remedy[,]... federal courts should invalidate any effort to preempt state remedies." Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1519 (1987).
202 See Monaghan, supra note 187, at 238-41 (criticizing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85 (1983), which seemed to dispense with any right of action analysis in a suit for declaratory and
equitable relief based upon claims of federal preemption); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 12, at 947-48, 1137 (discussing Shaw and questioning whether there is "an implied federal
declaratory and injunctive remedy that does not depend on the existence or interpretation of the
Declaratory Judgment Act").
203 The Court is unlikely to find implied rights of action in newly minted legislation. See
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 44I U.S. 677, 718 (x979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Congress,
at least during the period of the enactment .... tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to
decide whether there should be a private right of action, rather than determining this question for
itself.... [T]he ball, so to speak, may well now be in [Congress's] court."); id. at 749 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]e should not condone the implication of any private action from a federal statute
absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist.");
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 841 (stating that "post-Cannon decisions recognizing a new
implied tight of action are extremely rare"). By contrast, statutes that were enacted during the
heyday of implied rights of action continue to receive the benefit of that fact. See Morse v.
Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1i86, 1211 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (arguing that evaluation of
whether a private right of action exists under the Voting Rights Act depends on the legal context
at the time Congress enacted the act); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 381 (1982).
204 Although implied preemption of § 1983 claims is not favored, see Monaghan, supra note
x87, at 247-48, the Court's finding that the remedial scheme in IGRA was particularly compre-
hensive would also argue that § 1983 actions are foreclosed. See Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-2X (i98i) (ruling that the existence of
"express remedies" in a statute "demonstrates not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied
private actions but also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be avail-
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Seminole Tribe does not disturb the doctrine of Young. Unless
Congress provides otherwise, Young permits prospective federal court
relief against state officials.205 If the reality is that state officials can
still be held accountable under Young and under statutory schemes
that furnish remedies against state officials (provided that these reme-
dies do not violate other constitutional provisions, such as the Tenth
Amendment), then being unable to sue the state eo nomine in federal
court will prevent a federal forum only in rare situations, 20 6 like Semi-
nole Tribe, in which Congress has provided a remedy against the state
but not against the state officials. In such cases, however, the plain-
tiffs may still have recourse in state courts under Reich and like cases,
assuming no exclusive federal jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the bottom of the current state sovereign immunity debate, how
much beyond mere symbolism - a factor I do not underestimate in
constitutional law - is at stake? Seminole Tribe's majority declared
that it is an "indignity" to subject a state to the judicial tribunals of
the United States at the "instance of private parties.120 7 The idea that
a state, an utterly abstract entity, has feelings about being sued by a
private party when "its" highest officials are regularly so sued surely
strains credulity.203 Indeed, in another federalism case, the Court sug-
gested that states serve as functional entities in the constitutional con-
text: "The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for
the benefit of the states or state governments as abstract political enti-
ties .... To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state government for the protection of individuals."
20 9
In rejecting Justice Souter's examination of the English common
law origins of sovereign immunity, the Seminole Tribe majority
claimed that Hans v. Lousiana "found its roots not solely in the com-
mon law of England, but in the much more fundamental 'jurispru-
dence in all civilized nations,' 210 and once again quoted from The
Federalist No. 81: "sovereign immunity 'is the general sense and the
able under § 1983"); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 1134-37 (discussing the Court's deci-
sion in Middlesex County Sewerage, "statutory supersession" of remedies under § 1983, and the
availability of § 1983 remedies in cases in which a federal statute preempts state law).
205 See supra p. 130-31.
206 See supra note 168.
207 Seminole Tribe, I16 S. CL at 1124 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Met-
calf & Eddy, Inc., 5o6 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208 Justice Stevens noted, in my view correctly, that "preventing 'indignity' ... is an 'embar-
rassingly insufficient' rationale for the [constitutional] rule" of state sovereign immunity. Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. CL at 1143 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 151
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
209 New York v. United States, 5o5 U.S. 144, i8i (1992).
210 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1130 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (i89o) (quot-
ing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (2o How.) 527, 529 (858)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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general practice of mankind.' 2 11 We are not informed of the contem-
porary practice of "civilized nations," nor, indeed, even of what nations
come within this ambit. Hamilton wrote to assuage general fears that
the new government might compel the states to follow the "civilized"
course of actually paying their just debts.2 12 The majority's devotion
to this doctrine of state sovereign immunity is, accordingly, mystify-
ing.2 13 In the end, Seminole Tribe simply perpetuates a questionable
line of reasoning, the negative effects of which may in any event be
circumvented. State sovereign immunity remains the exception, not
the rule, the rhetoric of state sovereignty notwithstanding.
211 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
xg6i)).
212 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6i).
213 Any real federalism concerns can be accommodated by doctrines less "blunt" than sovereign
immunity. See Shapiro, supra note I5, at 79.
